Well, I thank you, Senator Lugar.

Let me just do a round here myself. I’m very pleased that this

hearing is being held. It’s been quite some time since the committee

has explored this issue and one that I think we can all

agree remains one of the greatest challenges to our national

security.

Although we did appear to make some initial headway at the end

of the last administration, it’s clear from North Korea’s recent

provocations that we have not yet found a lasting resolution.

As the situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to deteriorate,

the United States needs to take a central role in determining

how best to engage Pyongyang and also send a clear message that

North Korea cannot use illicit weapons programs to demand concessions

from the international community, nor can it arrest American

citizens on apparently trumped-up charges and then find them

guilty in a closed-door trial. These actions will only invite further

isolation, greater hardship for the North Korean people, and, of

course, continued rejection by the international community.

I’m pleased that President Obama is seeking to engage meaningfully

on this issue, that the administration is working with many

of our friends and allies in the region and at the United Nations

to craft a strong multilateral response. The stakes are far too high

for an ad hoc, uncoordinated policy, and we must make clear that

violations of international law and basic human rights actually

have serious consequences.

Ambassador Bosworth, I believe North Korea continues to be, of

course, a critical threat to our national security and to the security

of our friends and allies in the region. Accordingly, we have to

prioritize this issue as long as North Korea continues these provocative

and dangerous actions.

Noting that you were recently quoted as saying, ‘‘I don’t think it’s

useful to try to persuade [the North Koreans] to do what they don’t

want to do’’ and that ‘‘in the end they will see that having dialogue

is in their interest,’’ how do we drive negotiations forward in a way

that is genuinely appealing to Pyongyang without simply waiting

for the North Koreans to rejoin the talks while they may well be

continuing to produce nuclear weapons?

There have been numerous press reports that

Kim Jong-il has selected his youngest son to be his successor, and

some analysts speculate that the recent nuclear and missile tests

were part of an effort to ensure a smooth transition of power to his

preferred heir.

Do you think our ability to move forward with the negotiations

is limited while Kim Jong-il remains in power and, more specifically,

what impact do you think an impending transition of power

would have on North Korea’s nuclear development program and

willingness to participate in negotiations—and also in this regard,

if Kim Jong-il’s youngest son has, in fact, been selected as the heir,

give me a little sense of what you think it might mean for our policy

toward North Korea.

I understand that up at the United Nations,

a draft resolution has been agreed to that would expand and

toughen multilateral sanctions toward North Korea. I recognize

you’re probably able to share very little of that because they are

ongoing discussions, but I’m interested to hear what specific mechanisms,

existing or otherwise, will be used to enforce both new and

existing sanctions.

I’m raising this concern because U.N. Security Council Resolution

1718, which passed in 2006, appeared to be a strong multilateral

tool in that it banned atomic explosions and long-range missile

launches by North Korea and imposed limited financial sanctions,

as well as a partial trade and arms embargo on Pyongyang. However,

as you well know, the measures have been widely ignored and

unenforced, and thereby basically rendered the multilateral effort

rather toothless.

Ambassador, what steps are being taken to ensure that this new

resolution, if it does pass, does not have essentially the same fate?

Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.